Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Psychology Theses

Department of Psychology

5-10-2019

Attentional Bias for Threat in Intergroup Anxiety
Michelle Rattinger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_theses

Recommended Citation
Rattinger, Michelle, "Attentional Bias for Threat in Intergroup Anxiety." Thesis, Georgia State University,
2019.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/14288699

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Psychology at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

ATTENTIONAL BIAS FOR THREAT IN INTERGROUP ANXIETY

by

MICHELLE RATTINGER

Under the Direction of Erin Tone, PhD

ABSTRACT
Threatening faces draw our attention with particular speed, a phenomenon commonly
documented using behavioral measures such as the facial dot probe task. However, other aspects
of the face that such tasks often fail to take into account, such as characteristics that signal race,
also may influence threat perception. If dot probe tasks are to continue to serve as key measures
of threat bias in research, we must understand whether and how the facial contexts in which
angry expressions appear influence people’s attention to those expressions. The current study
examined the ways in which emotional expression and facial race signifiers interact to convey
threat in individuals with varying levels of racial intergroup anxiety. I proposed that participant
race would moderate the relationship between intergroup anxiety and attentional bias to White
and Black stimulus faces. One hundred and sixteen participants (Black = 58; White = 58)

completed a modified version of the facial dot probe task, as well as self-report measures
encompassing intergroup anxiety and individual demographics. Results indicated that
participant race did not significantly moderate the association between intergroup anxiety for
Black or White threatening faces. However, key group differences in attentional biases for threat
were evident. White participants, but not Black participants, displayed statistically significant
biases toward Black threatening faces. Additionally, for White participants, but not Black
participants, increases in intergroup anxiety were associated with increases in attentional bias for
Black faces. These findings provide a first step toward understanding the influence that facial
signals of race may have on attentional allocation for threat cues within the dot probe task. They
also highlight the need for increased care when generalizing findings from dot probe studies to
diverse populations. Suggestions for future research include investigating the potential
contribution of implicit attitudes to attentional bias for outgroup threat and including gender as
an intergroup variable.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction and Overview
We pay attention to angry faces. While biases to attend to facial anger are most

pronounced in people with anxiety disorders (Bantin, Stevens, Gerlach, & Hermann, 2016;
Pergamin-Hight, Naim, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, & Bar-Haim, 2015), they are
also evident in the general population, particularly when faces are viewed very briefly (100 ms or
less; Cooper & Langton, 2006; Santesso et al., 2008). This evidence that, for most people, angry
faces quickly capture attention suggests that a preference for such cues in early visual attention
may be a hard-wired (Zajonc, 1984), evolved bias to detect signals of imminent or potential
danger (Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Like other evolutionarily-primed cues (e.g., snakes),
angry faces have been shown to require minimal analysis at rapid speeds, thus facilitating quick
defensive responses (Ohman & Mineka, 2001).
Angry expressions, however, are not the only facial characteristics that can convey threat.
Humans rapidly evaluate faces with mature features, for example, as more threatening than those
with juvenile features, such as large eyes and smaller nose bridges (Zebrowitz, 2017). They also
tend to judge faces that more closely resemble familiar individuals as less threatening and more
trustworthy (Zebrowitz, Bronstad, & Lee, 2007). The facial context in which an angry
expression appears may therefore amplify or attenuate its threat value—anger on an otherwise
non-threatening face may be evaluated differently than anger on a face with other characteristics
that signal threat.
This surprisingly understudied possibility has important implications for the
measurement of attention to facial threat. Commonly used measures, such as the facial dot probe
task, a behavioral paradigm that yields estimates of a person’s tendency to attend preferentially
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to particular emotional faces, are predicated on the idea that threat emanates from a face’s
emotional facial expression alone. However, empirical tests of this assumption are lacking. If
facial dot probe measures are to continue to serve as key measures of attention bias in research, it
is critical that we understand whether and how the facial contexts in which angry expressions
appear influence people’s attention to those expressions.
The present study was designed as a step toward clarifying whether and how attention
bias for angry expressions is influenced by the facial contexts in which those expressions appear.
I chose to focus on visible characteristics that signify racial group membership as my key
contextual variable, given evidence that racial outgroup cues, like angry expressions, can signal
threat for some people, particularly those with high levels of intergroup anxiety, or fear about
interacting with people who are not members of their own ingroups (Stephan, 2014). In the
following sections, I provide a review of the literatures that form the foundation for this study.
As a note, the language used to signify racial group membership for facial stimuli and
participants varies across studies; however, I use the terms Black and White to reflect the most
current guidelines for assigning labels to racial identity (American Psychological Association,
2010).
I first provide background on the dot probe task as a measure of attention bias for angry
faces and on extant knowledge about other facial characteristics that may also capture attention
in the context of this task. I then shift focus to the literature on how ingroup/outgroup signifiers,
such as visible racially-linked characteristics, can both serve as independent threat cues and
interact with emotional expressions to influence cognitive and behavioral responses, including
attention, when people are viewing faces of racial ingroup and outgroup members. Next, I
briefly survey the literature on intergroup anxiety and its associations with cognitive processing,
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before introducing my study’s hypotheses and design. I provide an overview of the methods
implemented and the main results of the study. I end with a discussion of the implications of the
results as well as study limitations and future directions.
1.2

Individual Differences and the Dot Probe
The visual dot probe task, which MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata first introduced in 1986,

is one of the most widely used paradigms for examining attentional biases for threat. In short,
the task provides a reaction time measure of attentional bias. During each trial, individuals
rapidly identify the location or position of a probe that replaces one of two simultaneously
displayed cues that differ according to a characteristic such as emotional valence (e.g., a neutral
cue and a threatening cue). Faster responses, on average, for probes that replace a cue of one
type (e.g., threatening) indicate a vigilant bias for that particular type of cue; slower responses,
on average, are commonly interpreted as indicating avoidance.
In one of the most widely used variants of this task, researchers have examined whether a
person presented with pairs of faces (typically, two pictures of the same model, one with a
neutral expression, one with an angry expression) will be faster to locate a probe when it replaces
the angry face than when it replaces the neutral face. Studies using the dot probe have found
that, on average, angry faces, which signal the presence or possibility of threat, preferentially
capture visual attention over more positive or neutral cues (Mogg, McNamara, Powys,
Rawlinson, Seiffer, & Bradley, 2000; Yiend, 2010). The paradigm has yielded evidence of
attentional biases for threat in a large body of research on individuals with anxiety (e.g., BarHaim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorm, 2007), PTSD (e.g., Fani et
al., 2012), eating disorders (Cardi, Di Matteo, Corfield, & Treasure, 2013), and alcohol abuse
(Forestell, Dickter, & Young, 2012), as well as in studies of healthy samples (e.g., Santesso et
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al., 2008). Although attentional biases for facial threat cues are most pronounced in highly
anxious samples when stimuli are presented for relatively long durations (500 ms; Klumpp &
Amir, 2009; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004), biases to attend to angry faces are also
evident in the general population when faces are displayed very briefly (100 ms or less; Cooper
& Langton, 2006; Santesso et al., 2008).
1.3

Stimulus Variations and Attention Bias
Although the facial dot probe task yields evidence of a mean bias for threat, attentional

patterns can be inconsistent at the individual level and overall reported effect sizes vary across
studies (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; van Rooijen, Ploeger, & Kret, 2017). Some individual
differences in attentional prioritization during facial dot probe tasks may occur because, for some
people, features of the face other than angry expressions carry threat value. Becker and
colleagues (2007), for instance, found healthy participants to more quickly and more accurately
detect anger on male faces than on female faces. Evidence also suggests that either averted or
direct gaze, depending on the population under study and the contexts in which stimuli appear,
may magnify perceptions of faces as threatening (Roelofs et al., 2010; Schmitz, Scheel, Rigon,
Gross, & Blechert, 2012). Indeed, research findings indicate that various stimulus characteristics
may combine with emotional valence to influence the motivational significance of a face, or the
extent to which the face is relevant to an organism’s needs and goals (Barrett, Mesquita, &
Gendron, 2011; Lundqvist, Esteves, & Ohman, 2004).
Researchers who have developed facial dot probe tasks appear to have acknowledged, at
least implicitly, the idea that faces can carry motivational significance as a function of
characteristics beyond emotion (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007; Roelofs
et al., 2010). In particular, facial dot probe tasks are commonly designed to ensure that stimuli
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with male/female features or averted/direct eye gaze appear in a balanced way across trials.
However, other stimulus characteristics that may influence attention, possibly by conveying
threat, have received less attention than have gender and gaze in the contexts of both task design
and performance interpretation. Characteristics such as those that indicate ingroup/outgroup
status, which most published facial dot probe studies fail to take into account, warrant
examination as well.
1.3.1

Ingroup/outgroup status cues as markers of threat

Facial features that serve as markers of ingroup/outgroup status—whether the viewed
person belongs to the same group as or a different group from the viewer— are rapidly encoded,
along with cues indicating membership in other categories, such as sex and age group
(Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). For example, skin color, eye shape, and nose width are
commonly perceived as indicators of membership in a racial group (e.g., Stepanova & Strube,
2009). Both theory and empirical data suggest that such featural details can contribute to a
face’s motivational relevance, or the degree to which the face stimulates approach or avoidance.
Cosmides et al. (2003) proposed that people rapidly encode race-linked cues because
they offer clues about danger in our environments. According to their model, we typically view
features that phenotypically resemble our own as signals of safety, and thus find them preferable
to those that look different, and that therefore may represent threat. Cosmides and colleagues
suggest that, because there is no part of our “cognitive architecture” that is solely dedicated to
the encoding of race, the human mind maps indicators of race onto a cognitive variable—
coalition—that is built upon perceived (or misperceived) race-delineated social alliances.
Findings from at least two studies suggest that race may influence patterns of attention to
faces within the context of the dot probe paradigm. Trawalter, Todd, Baird, and Richeson (2008)
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briefly presented White, non-anxious participants with face pairs comprising one Black face and
one White face (both neutral in expression). After 30 ms, a probe replaced one of the faces on
each trial. Participants were faster to detect the probe when it replaced a Black face than they
were when it replaced a White face. Trawalter and colleagues interpreted their findings as
suggesting that the race of a stimulus face may itself elicit attentional prioritization for
individuals of a different race. This prioritization, they proposed, occurs because people tend to
perceive members of other groups as more threatening than ingroup members. In their 2008
study, they attributed their White participants’ attentional bias toward Black faces specifically to
a stereotype linking Black men and danger.
Donders, Correll, and Wittenbrink (2008) obtained similar findings using a spatial cueing
task to measure attentional capture and maintenance in a small (n = 28) sample of White
students, who also completed a measure of stereotype accessibility. In their study, the more
readily accessible participants’ danger stereotypes about Black people were, the faster Black
faces captured their attention, even when prejudice and the effects of danger-irrelevant
stereotypes were covaried. The authors suggest that these findings reflect an acquired
conditioned response to Black faces among those participants who held the strongest stereotypes
of Black people as dangerous or threatening.
1.3.2

Interaction of ingroup/outgroup status cues with emotional expressions

Other research indicates that race-linked characteristics may also affect the ways in which
people perceive, interpret, and respond to a face’s emotional expressions (Blair & Judd, 2011;
Fani, Bradley-Davino, Ressler, McClure-Tone., 2011; Ito & Urland, 2003; van der Schalk et al.,
2011). One study, for example, found that White participants showed a preferential bias in
recognition accuracy for ingroup (White) compared to outgroup (Black) faces when expressions
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were neutral; when expressions were angry, participants identified outgroup (Black) faces more
accurately (Ackerman et al., 2006). Moreover, Chiu, Ambady, and Deldin (2004), found that
race and emotional valence of facial stimuli together modulated early cognitive responses to
emotional ingroup and outgroup faces in a nearly exclusively White sample (1 participant
identified as Asian). Specifically, relative to low-prejudice participants, high-prejudice
individuals who were cued to expect an angry, black face on a screen displayed a weaker
response in the early contingent negative variation (CNV) component of the event-related brain
potential (ERP), which is implicated in controlled anticipatory responses to a warning stimulus
(Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001) and modulated, under some circumstances, by emotion (Hart,
Lucena, Cleary, Belger, & Donkers, 2012). The weaker CNV in high prejudiced individuals in
anticipation of viewing black angry faces suggested a reduced tendency to monitor automatic
stereotype-driven responses to angry outgroup faces. Those who endorsed high levels of
prejudice also responded more quickly to angry Black faces. The authors attributed this pattern
of findings to difficulty suppressing prejudiced behavior among the high-prejudice participants,
and noted this was consistent with the weaker CNV findings.
Results from a few neuroimaging studies raise the possibility that these interactions
between racial and emotional cues may occur, at least in part, because race-linked features elicit
brain activity in regions that also activate in response to threatening facial expressions
(Checkroud, Evertt, Bridge, & Hewstone, 2014). In one functional magnetic resonance (fMRI)
study, for example, White participants viewed briefly presented (either 30 ms or 525 ms)
emotionally-neutral Black and White faces (Cunningham et al., 2004). Activation in the
amygdala, a structure in the medial temporal lobe implicated in the perception of emotional
salience (particularly threat) (Phelps, 2006), was stronger for Black than White faces presented
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for 30 ms. No differences emerged in this region when faces remained on the screen for 525 ms.
At the longer presentation time, however, Black faces elicited more activity in brain regions such
as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), both of which
appear to play roles in regulation and executive control (Chen, Zhao, Song, Guan, & Wu, 2017;
Krill & Platek, 2009). Notably, this finding is in line with other fMRI research that has linked
DLPFC and ACC activation with attempts among individuals who value being unprejudiced to
“control” automatic reactions to outgroup stimuli presented at long (2000 ms) durations
(Richeson et al., 2003). Taken together, these findings suggest that people very rapidly register
the emotional salience of racial group membership, but then quickly modulate their automatic
affective responses.
There is also recent evidence from neuroimaging research that, consistent with Donders
and colleagues’ (2008) interpretation of their findings regarding attention bias for Black faces,
the increased amygdala activity observed in White people in response to Black faces compared
to White faces reflects a learned response to potential threat. Telzer and colleagues (2013)
conducted fMRI scans of 32 youths (ages 4-16 years) while they viewed Black and White faces.
Their results indicated that distinct neural responses to race were not evident until early
adolescence (Telzer et al., 2013). Moreover, participants with more racially diverse peer
networks showed weaker amygdala responses to other-race faces than did those with more
homogeneous peer groups. The authors interpreted these findings as evidence that culturallylearned associations of particular group with threat and danger may shape amygdala sensitivity
to race.
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1.3.3

Ingroup/outgroup status cues and attention bias for threat in faces

To summarize briefly, findings from several lines of research suggest that race-related
facial characteristics interact with emotional expressions to influence how people categorize,
remember, and interpret faces (Ackerman et al., 2006; Ambady, Chiao, Chiu, & Deldin, 2006;
Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2003). Few studies have begun to examine whether facial
indicators of racial ingroup/outgroup status may modulate patterns of attention toward anger. In
one study, Otten (2016) found evidence that race and emotion together may guide attention to
faces, much as they influence other cognitive processes, during a visual search paradigm.
Participants, who were mostly White or Asian American, were faster to detect angry and
frightened faces within arrays of neutral faces (always an equal number of White and Black
faces) when the target faces were Black than when they were White. When happy faces served
as targets, however, participants showed no attentional preferences for faces of either race.
These findings suggest that, at least for White and Asian American adults, when a face possesses
both outgroup (Black) and negative valence characteristics (anger), it may be particularly quick
to draw attention.
1.3.4

Viewer race and attention bias for threat in same- and other-race faces

Most studies of race and attention bias have recruited exclusively White samples; it is
thus unclear how readily their findings generalize to members of other racial groups, particularly
those that represent minority or marginalized identities. In one of the only studies to use a fully
balanced (participant race by stimulus race) design, Dickter and Bartholow (2008) collected both
behavioral and ERP data from Black and White adults while they completed a computerized
flanker task. During each trial of this task, pictures of Black and White men and women
appeared in five-item arrays (four flanker faces surrounding a target face; all had neutral
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expressions). Participants were asked to rapidly identify the gender of the face in the center of
each array. Results revealed that stimulus race, though task-irrelevant, influenced attention, such
that participants responded more slowly when flanker faces were of a different race than the
target face.
Crucially, participant self-identified race interacted with target face race to influence
patterns of ERP response. Indeed, White and Black participants showed near-opposite patterns
of electrocortical activity. For White participants, P300 amplitudes, markers of early attention
that have been linked to perceptions of threat (Corell, Urland, & Ito, 2006), were enhanced when
the target face was Black. For Black participants, the same pattern was evident when the target
face was White.
Broadly, Dickter and Bartholow’s (2008) findings suggest that both stimulus and
participant race figure in split-second decisions about where to direct our attention when we are
confronted with complex social cues, such as faces. Faces provide a wealth of potentially useful
information; individuals must selectively direct attention to characteristics most likely to be
functionally important. Dickter and Bartholow’s (2008) study provides evidence that individuals
from different racial groups show distinct patterns of attention to ingroup and outgroup faces;
however, it leaves open the question of whether the emotional valence of ingroup and outgroup
faces may enhance or attenuate these attentional patterns or vice versa. In addition, it provides
little information about why outgroup faces capture attention—although both theory (e.g.,
Cosmides et al. 2003) and empirical data (Trawalter et al., 2008) suggest that they may do so
because they represent threat, it is also possible that they are salient for other reasons, such as
novelty.
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One way to evaluate whether components of a face beyond emotional expression
influence attention for threat is to focus on a group of individuals for whom other facial
characteristics connote danger or threat. Such an approach permits examination of whether
ostensibly universal threat cues such as angry expressions acquire increased salience and
motivational significance when they appear in the context of other facial cues that some
individuals link to danger. People who experience a type of anxiety that has been termed
“intergroup anxiety” (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), constitute a useful population for such an
investigation.
1.4

Intergroup Anxiety
Intergroup anxiety has been defined as a type of anxiety that individuals experience in

anticipation of or during interactions with members of other groups (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).
How one’s affiliated group is defined can vary widely; for example, one’s ingroup might
comprise those of the same race, age, religion, or nationality. Stephan and Stephan (1985) noted
that because intergroup anxiety is inherently characterized by worry about social interactions, it
may be most appropriately viewed as a type of social anxiety that is specific to intergroup
contexts—that is, contexts that involve interaction with members of other groups.
Affectively, intergroup anxiety is marked by apprehension, aversion, and fear both in
anticipation of (Britt, Boniecki, Vescio, Biernat, & Brown, 1996) and during (Amodio, 2009)
intergroup exchanges. In addition, individuals with high levels of intergroup anxiety, at least
those with anxiety regarding race, have been shown to exhibit increased blood pressure, cortisol
levels, and galvanic skin responses in real or imagined intergroup contexts (Littleford, Wrights,
& Sayoc-Parial, 2005; Trawalter, Adam, Chase-Lansdale, & Richeson, 2012). Notably,
physiological responses among intergroup anxious individuals during real or hypothetical
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ingroup interactions in these studies were comparable to those of peers who endorsed minimal
intergroup anxiety, suggesting the anxiety that they experience is specific to interactions with
outgroup members.
More recent work suggests that, while certain concerns are likely shared across
individuals with high levels of intergroup anxiety, group-level differences such as
majority/minority status also appear to be associated with distinct intergroup worries. For
example, whereas racial majority group members may worry primarily about appearing
prejudiced, racial minority group members may, in contrast, worry primarily about being
discriminated against (Doerr, Plant, Kunstman, & Buck, 2011; Shelton & Richeson, 2006). The
most widely implemented measure of intergroup anxiety yields a unitary score (Stephan &
Stephan, 1985) that incorporates questions assessing for both types of potential anxiety to
account for potential differences in the experience of interracial interactions. Though the central
concerns of people with intergroup anxiety may vary, depending on whether or not they identify
with a group that is dominant or in the majority, they share tendencies to perceive ingroup
members positively and outgroup members negatively (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) and to have
stronger negative implicit associations for outgroup than ingroup individuals (Amodio &
Hamilton, 2012). They also tend to expect negative outcomes from outgroup interactions (Plant
& Devine, 2003). Further, high levels of intergroup anxiety have been linked to other relevant,
and potentially related, variables including outgroup prejudice, stereotypes, and magnified threat
perception (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).
1.4.1

Intergroup Anxiety and Visual Perception

While no published research appears to have examined patterns of attention for threat
from ingroup and outgroup individuals in people with intergroup anxiety, intergroup anxiety has
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been shown to relate more broadly to perceptions of and responses to visual cues. For example,
Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Devine (2003) found that White individuals who obtained high
scores on a measure of external motivation to respond without prejudice (high-EM; a commonlystudied facet of intergroup anxiety) showed stronger startle eyeblink responses when presented
with Black faces than when presented with White faces. The authors interpreted their findings as
consistent with a pattern of early attention and aversive reaction to the outgroup faces among
high-EM participants.
Similarly, Ofan, Rubin, and Amodio (2014) found that high-EM White individuals
showed larger responses in the N170 component of recorded event-related potential (ERP), an
electrical signal that peaks shortly after faces are visually presented (Carmel & Bentin, 2002),
when viewing Black compared to White faces. The authors concluded that their findings
represented further evidence that intergroup anxiety modulates very early stages of processing.
Specifically, they suggested that outgroup (Black) faces, which were especially relevant to highEM participants’ social-evaluative concerns, elicited preferential neural responses.
Researchers have begun to probe whether this high-EM aspect of intergroup anxiety is
associated with performance on behavioral measures of early visual attention as well. For
example, Richeson and Trawalter (2008) found significant attentional biases for outgroup faces
in high-EM individuals relative to low-EM peers during a dot-probe task that presented
Black/White face pairs with either neutral or happy expressions as stimuli for either 30 ms or 450
ms. White high-EM participants displayed an attentional bias toward Black faces in Black/White
neutral pairs and only on trials when face pairs were presented for 30 ms. This attention bias
was not evident during trials with Black/White happy pairs. Although one effort to replicate this
study through the Reproducibility Project failed (Lai, 2012), Richeson and colleagues have since
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published additional research that supports their earlier findings; in this newer work, they used
eye tracking methodology to index attention. In a follow-up study, participants high in EM
compared to those low in EM displayed an initial orienting of attention, as evidenced via eye
tracking, toward Black faces in Black and White facial dyads (Bean et al., 2012). The authors
interpreted this finding as indicative that for White participants high in EM, Black faces may
serve as a social threat cue and thus rapidly capture attention, similar to findings from other
studies that have demonstrated biases toward sample-relevant threatening stimuli (Mogg &
Bradley, 2002).
1.5

Summary and Introduction of Present Study
Dot probe tasks are a widely used measure of attention bias, and although their

psychometric properties have been questioned (e.g., Price et al., 2015), studies using these tasks
have yielded fairly consistent evidence that humans are biased to attend to threat cues,
particularly if the cues are linked to a salient source of threat for a given individual. If these
measures are to continue to serve as key measures of attention bias in research, it is critical that
we understand fully the factors that drive patterns of response. Taken together, the literature to
date suggests that race-related features and emotional expression can be conflated in evaluations
of threat. Existing data do not, however, clarify whether threat associated with angry
expressions and threat associated with racial signifiers may combine for some people to intensify
or otherwise modulate attentional biases that are measured with dot probe tasks.
Therefore, this project aims to explore the potential influence of additional facial
indicators of threat, namely features that connote racial group membership, on attentional bias
for angry faces in the context of the dot probe task. I predict that emotional expression and the
model’s race will each contribute to attention bias, such that a) all participants, regardless of their
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intergroup anxiety, will show biased attention toward angry faces, and b) intergroup anxiety will
be more strongly associated with biased attention toward anger displayed by members of
participants’ outgroups than anger displayed by members of participants’ ingroups. In other
words, at higher levels of intergroup anxiety, bias to attend to outgroup faces that are also angry
should be higher. At lower levels of intergroup anxiety, there should be no significant difference
between bias scores for ingroup and outgroup angry faces.
Thus, for White participants at higher levels of intergroup anxiety, threat bias will be
stronger when Black threat/neutral face pairs serve as stimuli than when White threat/neutral
face pairs serve as stimuli. For Black participants at higher levels of intergroup anxiety, threat
bias will be stronger when White threat/neutral face pairs serve as stimuli than when Black
threat/neutral face pairs serve as stimuli. Participants of either race with low levels of intergroup
anxiety are expected to show a general threat bias (comparable patterns of attention to White and
Black angry faces).
2
2.1

METHODS

Participants
Participants were recruited from the Georgia State University psychology department

research pool as well as from paper flyers advertised on the downtown campus. Study
participants comprised 116 individuals aged between 18 and 34 years (M = 20.12).
Participants eligible to enroll in the study were those who identified as primarily
Black/African-American or White/Caucasian, native English speakers, and adults between the
ages of 18 and 40, and who possessed normal or corrected vision. Recruiting individuals from
an urban campus that ranks nationally for racial and ethnic diversity (U.S. News & World
Report, 2018) facilitated an even distribution of participants who self-identify primarily as
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Black/African-American (n = 58) or White/Caucasian (n = 58). Participants were mainly
undergraduate students (59 freshmen, 19 sophomores, 15 juniors, 17 seniors, two unsure of
undergraduate class placement), although the sample also included graduate students (n = 2)
and university staff (n = 2). Across the full sample, 30 participants identified as male, 82 as
female, two as gender-fluid, one as non-binary, and one as a transgender man (see Table 1 for
full sample and group demographics). All participants provided informed consent to
participate in this study, as approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Review
Board.
Table 1. Participant Demographic Data
Black
(n = 58)

Age
Gender Identity
Male
Female
Transgender man
Non-binary
Gender fluid
Education
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Undergrad (unsure yr.)
Graduate Student/Staff

White
(n = 58)

Total
(N = 116)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

19.96

3.34

20.26

3.22

20.12

3.27

#

%

#

%

#

%

12
45
0
0
1

20.7
77.6
0
0
1.7

18
37
1
1
1

31.0
63.8
1.7
1.7
1.7

30
82
1
1
2

25.9
70.7
0.9
0.9
0.18

28
12
6
10
0
2

48.3
20.7
10.3
17.2
0
3.4

31
7
9
7
2
2

53.4
12.1
15.5
12.1
3.4
3.4

59
19
15
17
2
4

50.9
16.4
12.9
14.7
1.7
3.4

SD

Notes. Gender identity terms reflect participant self-reported responses via survey item text
entry. Groups (individuals who identified primarily as Black or White) did not differ
significantly according to age, t(111) = -.484, p = .630. Additionally, there were no group
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differences according to gender identity (Cramer’s V = .185, p = .409) or education (Cramer’s
V = .199, p = .467).
2.2

Procedure
Participants completed consent and study procedures during a single visit to a lab space

located on Georgia State University’s campus. At the beginning of the visit, trained research
staff reviewed the study procedures with participants, provided answers to participants’
questions, and obtained informed consent. Participants completed all portions of the study,
including 1) computerized self-report questionnaires, and 2) a computerized attention bias task.
The order in which participants completed the two study components (self-report questionnaires
and computer task) was counterbalanced across participants. After completion of the study,
participants were provided with a debriefing sheet that outlined aims of the study and the ways
in which their participation provided contributions to the field. The entire testing session,
including consent, computer tasks, and debriefing procedures took approximately 45 minutes.
2.3

Measures
2.3.1

Measure of Intergroup Anxiety

The Intergroup Anxiety Scale (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). This 15-item self-report
measure of intergroup anxiety has been revised and adapted for use in many studies (e.g.,
Barlow, Louis, & Terry, 2010; Van Zomeren, Fischer, & Spears, 2007; Vezzali &
Giovannini, 2012). Each version, however, has maintained an emphasis on the emotional
component of intergroup interactions. The scale requires respondents to select the degree to
which they experience varied affective states (e.g., nervous, self-conscious, worried, afraid)
in anticipation of different types of imagined intergroup interactions. Each of the 15
statements focuses on a different anticipated emotional reaction. Participants rate their
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anticipated emotional responses to each statement (e.g., “meeting strangers and introducing
yourself”) using a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = “not at all nervous”, 10 = “extremely
nervous”). The original measure focused on interactions with people of Moroccan origin;
researchers typically modify the wording to be appropriate to the groups that are taking part
in their studies. For the present study, I adapted the language of the scale to focus on
White/Black intergroup interactions.
The internal consistency of the measure has been shown to be high across at least 16
studies (mean α = .91) (Stephan, 2014). When similar analyses were conducted on the
intergroup anxiety measures used in this study, results were comparable. Cronbach’s alpha
indicated that the intergroup anxiety measure possessed good internal consistency in both
Black (α =.912) and White (α =.911) participant versions. One study reported moderate testretest reliability (r =.49), with alphas of .79 at Time 1 and .82 at Time 2 six months later
(Binder et al., 2009). Investigations of the discriminant validity of this intergroup anxiety
measure have found intergroup anxiety to make unique contributions to predictions of
negative outcomes such as prejudiced behavior and found the construct to correlate
significantly with other measures of negative outgroup expectations, such as symbolic and
realistic group threats and negative stereotypes (Stephan, 2014).
2.3.2

Attention Bias Task

Dot Probe Task. The 160-trial dot probe task was presented using Eprime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) software to ensure consistency of stimulus
presentation timing. Each 1700 millisecond (ms) trial consisted of a 500 ms fixation, a 100 ms
“cue” (a face pair), and an 1100 ms “probe” (asterisk). Participants were told to indicate the
location (right or left on screen) of the probe via keyboard key press. The intertrial interval
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(ITI) varied randomly between 750 ms and 1,250 ms as is commonly recommended as a
precaution against potential interference or carry-over effects from trial to trial (Compton,
Heaton, & Ozer, 2017).
Facial stimuli were selected from four sets of validated images: the NimStim set
(Tottenham et al., 2009), the Productive Aging Face Database (Minear & Park, 2004), images
used by Bradley and colleagues (1997) in a widely-used dot-probe task version, and the GSU
Diverse Faces set (Schmidt, Davis, & Tone, 2012). The selected images were determined to be
good exemplars of threatening, happy, and neutral expressions based on undergraduate
students’ ratings. Students judged how well each face represented the emotion it was intended
to convey and how distinct the faces were from other emotional expressions (Schmidt & Tone,
2014).
Face pairs each represented one of three conditions: paired neutral faces (neutral-neutral
trials); angry face paired with a neutral face (threat-neutral trials); or happy face paired with a
neutral face (happy-neutral trials). For threat-neutral and happy-neutral pairs, an emotional and
a neutral expression from the same person was paired; for neutral-neutral trials, the same image
appeared on both sides of the screen. Facial stimuli included grayscale images of White
and Black models, with an equal number of male and female faces. No model appeared
more than once in the task. In the total 64 threat-neutral and 64 happy-neutral trials, the
emotional face appeared on the left 50% of the time.
For both threat and happy pairings, there were eight possible stimulus conditions
(balanced combinations of the following characteristics: emotional face location, face gender,
face race), with eight trials per condition. The probe replaced an emotional picture in half of the
emotion-face (congruent) trials and a neutral face during the other half (incongruent). In the 32
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neutral-neutral trials, the probe appeared on the left 50% of the time. For neutral-neutral pairings,
there were four possible stimulus conditions (balanced combinations of face gender and face
race), with eight trials per condition. The order of trials was randomized for each participant.
Participants were instructed to press one of two keyboard buttons to indicate whether
the probe appeared on the left or the right of the screen. Faster response times on average to
probes that replaced emotional facial stimuli than to probes that replaced neutral faces
indicated an initial orientation or vigilance for that emotion. Bias scores were calculated from
response times to probes that replace threatening faces, as threat has been consistently
associated with increased vigilance in anxious populations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). For
responses to both Black threat and White threat, mean response latency for congruent trials
(probe replaces threat face) was subtracted from latency for incongruent trials (probe appears
on opposite side of the screen from the threat face). Positive bias scores indicated an
attentional bias toward threatening faces relative to matched neutral faces, and negative bias
scores indicated a bias to direct attention away from threatening faces.
A recent meta-analysis by Bar-Haim and colleagues (2007) showed that across dozens
of studies that have used the dot probe task, the computer measure successfully distinguished
response patterns between anxious and non-anxious groups. While the task is effective in this
regard, several empirical studies have found that it shows low internal consistency and testretest reliability (Price et al., 2015; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014;
Waters, Lipp, & Spence, 2004). In a recent review, Price et al. (2015) noted that task
reliability may vary as a function of sample (e.g., clinical, subclinical, type of anxiety), task
design (e.g., stimuli, presentation times, vertical vs horizontal pair display, etc.), and analytical
procedures. For this reason, Zvielli, Bernstein, and Koster (2015) suggested using trial-level
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bias scores (TL-BS), obtained by calculating the difference in reaction time between each
threat-congruent trial and its neighboring threat-incongruent trial. Essentially, this approach
allows for sensitive measurement of attention bias fluctuations on a trial-to-trial level. In their
own investigations, Zvielli and colleagues have found that scores on an attention bias
variability index, which accounts for the variability in bias across the span of the task, explain
more variance between anxious and nonanxious samples than do scores on the more traditional
aggregated mean index introduced by MacLeod et al. (1986), which assumes attentional bias
is a static rather than variable or fluctuating phenomenon.
In this study, I calculated the widely-used aggregated mean index of attention bias, to
allow for more meaningful comparisons and extensions of previous dot-probe work. However,
I also calculated threat-level bias and bias variability scores, that might provide additional insight
into the stability and general nature of attention bias for threat. So that I could acquire the
required number of trials and meet the recommended standards to calculate threat-level bias
scores (Zvielli et al., 2015), participants completed a second 96-trial dot probe block
immediately following the main task. This additional dot probe block included only angryneutral (64) and neutral-neutral (32) trials. Limiting trials in the block to angry-neutral pairs
increased the likelihood of obtaining the required number of trials to implement TL-BS. It
also reduced potential interference from trials (e.g., happy-neutral pairs) excluded from
analysis. I counterbalanced threat and probe location just as I did in the first dot probe block.
2.3.3

Demographics Survey

The Center for Collegiate Mental Health (CCMH) Standardized Data Set (SDS)
demographic questionnaire is a self-report measure that yields information about age, gender
identity, race, and other demographic and personal characteristics. The measure was developed
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explicitly for use with college students (Locke, Bieschke, Castonguay, & Hayes, 2012). The
survey items represent questions often asked of students seeking mental health services at
university counseling centers; they were selected based on input from over 100,000 college
students seeking mental health treatment across 770,000 appointments and 2,700 clinicians at
139 college and university counseling centers (Center for Collegiate Mental Health, 2016).
Participants were provided with 18 core items from the demographic survey that included both
multiple choice and open response items (see Appendix A). Self-identified race from this survey
(Black/African-American, White/Caucasian) served as a moderator in subsequent analyses.
2.3.4

Measure of State-Trait Anxiety

State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA; Ree, French,
MacLeod, & Locke, 2008). The STICSA is a self-report questionnaire that assesses both
cognitive and somatic symptoms across two subscales of state (i.e., in the moment) and trait
(i.e., general) anxiety. The two subscales include an identical list of 21 items composed of 10
cognitive items (e.g., “think worst will happen” and 11 somatic items (e.g., “heart beats fast”).
Respondents indicate how often each statement is true about themselves, first “at this very
moment” and on the subsequent scale “in general”, on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = “not at
all”, 4 = “very much so”). Within a nonclinical sample, the mean STICSA-State score was
35.0 and the average STICSA-Trait score was 37.0 (Grös, et al., 2007). Across participants
with anxiety diagnoses including social phobia, panic disorder, and OCD the average
STICSA-State score was 46.6 and the average STICSA-Trait score was 51.2.
A measure designed to better distinguish between pure anxiety symptoms and
depressive symptoms than other commonly-used measures (e.g., State Trait Anxiety
Inventory; Spielberger et al., 1983), the STICSA has demonstrated good discriminant validity
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from measures of depression (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Moreover, it shows
good convergent validity with other measures of anxiety, including the STAI State and Trait
and DASS scales (rs > .57). The measure also exhibited good internal consistency in clinical
(STICSA State α=.88; STICSA Trait α= .87, for the cognitive and somatic subscales) and
nonclinical samples (αs > .90) (Grös et al., 2007; Ree et al., 2008). Preliminary analyses
conducted on the STICSA measures in this study suggested similar outcomes; both the
STICA-State (α = .914) and STICSA-Trait (α = .915) demonstrated acceptable internal
consistency. I included this measure to permit examination, in follow-up exploratory
analyses, of the specificity of associations between intergroup anxiety and patterns of
attentional bias.
2.3.5

Power Analysis

A power analysis was conducted using G*Power software, with linear multiple
regression as the determined statistical test. Studies of threat-related attentional biases at short
presentation times have yielded main effects that range in size from small to medium (Bantin et
al., 2016; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). As an effect size based on an interaction term provided the
closest approximation for this analysis, I used an f-value of .08, which is a small effect that is
consistent with the interaction effect observed in a study that is comparable to the proposed
research in terms of design and content (Bardeen & Orcutt, 2001). Both independent variables
(threat bias score and participant self-identified race) were included as predictors in the
calculation. With alpha error probability set at .05, the output calculated for R2 increase
revealed that in order to achieve 80% power to detect effects, a sample size of 101 was large
enough to maximize power and reduce the potential for Type II error. I recruited 116
individuals to account for possible attrition and allow for a more conservative analysis.
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2.3.6

Statistical Analyses

I tested the hypothesis that participant race would moderate the relationship between
intergroup anxiety and attentional bias to threatening White and Black faces. I assessed for
moderator effects of participant race on the association between intergroup anxiety and
attentional bias for threat through linear regression. Crucially, regression allowed for the
appropriate analysis of the intergroup anxiety predictor as a continuous variable, whereas other
methods would necessitate dichotomization and potentially a loss of power to detect effects.
This approach permitted me to explore variability within the full spectrum of intergroup
anxiety in an ecologically valid manner (Maccallum et al, 2002; Irwin & McClelland, 2003).
I conducted two multiple hierarchical linear regression analyses to examine intergroup
anxiety scores, participant race, and their interaction as predictors of attentional bias for threat.
For the first model, bias scores for angry Black faces served as the dependent variable; for the
second, bias scores for angry White faces were the dependent variable. In preparation for
analyses, I mean-centered the predictor variable (intergroup anxiety) in order to minimize
nonessential collinearity and to facilitate clearer interpretation of main effects. The moderator
was dummy coded (0 = Black, 1 = White) to reflect two levels of the participant race variable.
Variables were entered into the hierarchical regression in two blocks: Block 1) meancentered intergroup anxiety variable and participant race; and Block 2) the mean-centered
intergroup anxiety x participant race interaction term. The interaction term was calculated by
multiplying the mean-centered intergroup anxiety variable and the participant race variable.

25

3
3.1

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
I calculated descriptive statistics prior to conducting correlational and regression

analyses (see Tables 2 and 3). Values were calculated for the whole sample (N = 116), as well
as Black and White groups separately (n = 58, n = 58). In the overall sample, participants’
attention was biased toward threatening faces in general (M = 2.44, SD = 14.33) and toward
Black threatening faces, specifically (M = 5.60, SD = 20.38). On average, participants were
slower to identify probes that replaced White threatening faces (M = -.918, SD = 19.92). While
it is common to interpret any average bias score above 0 as an attentional bias toward a stimulus
and any score below 0 as an attentional bias away from a stimulus (Mogg et al., 2000), some
researchers choose instead to identify the presence of attentional bias when scores significantly
differ from 0 (Mogg & Bradley, 2016). In the overall sample, bias for Black threatening faces
(M = 5.60, 20.38) was significantly different from 0, t(115) = 2.96, p = .004, representing a
modest bias. The full sample did not demonstrate biases significantly different from 0 for White
threatening faces t(115) = -.50, p = .621 or threatening faces in general t(115) = 1.84, p = .68.
Group-level analyses suggest that White participants’ bias scores may drive the
significant bias for Black threatening faces in the overall sample. T-tests revealed that White
participants demonstrated biases significantly different from 0 toward Black threatening faces,
t(57) = 2.43, p = .018, while Black participants did not reveal statistically significant biases
toward or away from Black threatening faces, t(57) = 1.842, p = .071.
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Table 2. Overall Means and Standard Deviations for Participants (N = 116)
Variable
Min
Max
M
SD
Bias for Threat Overall

-37.00

57.81

2.44

14.33

Bias for Black Threat

-50.67

82.40

5.60**

20.38

Bias for White Threat

-59.48

61.06

-.917

19.92

Intergroup Anxiety

16

150

80.53

30.422

STICSA State

21

67

34.11

11.814

STICSA Trait

21

70

39.13

12.250

Notes. STICSA = State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety. Mean bias score
values denoted with an asterisk(s) indicate statistical significance from zero.

**

p < .01, * p < .05.

Table 3. Group-level means and differences
Black
White
(n = 58)
(n = 58)
Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Bias for Threat Overall

2.67

15.30

2.23

13.42

.17

.868

Bias for Black Threat

5.51

22.78

5.69*

17.87

-0.05

.962

Bias for White Threat

0.05

18.35

-1.89

21.49

0.54

.601

Intergroup Anxiety

88.88

30.93

72.19

27.73

3.06**

.003

STICSA State

31.71

10.35

36.52

12.76

-2.23*

.028

STICSA Trait

35.93

11.21

42.33

12.50

-2.90**

.004

t

p

Notes. STICSA = State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety. Mean bias score
values denoted with an asterisk(s) indicate statistical significance from zero. T-values denoted
with an asterisk(s) indicate significant group differences.

**

p < .01, * p < .05.
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3.1.1

Trial-level bias score (TL-BS) analyses
Attentional bias scores toward overall threat were also calculated using trial- level bias

score (TL-BS) parameters outlined in Zvielli, Bernstein, and Koster (2015). This strategy
averages positive differences in reaction time between each threat-congruent trial and its
neighboring threat-incongruent trial throughout the task. TL-BS scores account for potential
fluctuations in attentional bias over the course of the dot probe run, and have demonstrated
stronger psychometric properties than the traditional aggregated mean score in recent studies
(Price et al., 2015). Other investigations of these new bias indices advise caution in interpreting
results, which have been shown to be sensitive to measurement error (Krujit, Field, & Fox,
2016). Aggregated mean bias scores (as used to calculate attentional biases toward threat in the
main analyses), trial-level bias scores, and attentional variability indices were calculated from
this negative-only dot probe block. The trial-level biases scores included individual values for
mean bias toward and mean bias away from threat in general. Separate bias scores for Black
threatening faces and White threatening faces could not be calculated due to an insufficient
number of threat trial pairs.
The aggregated mean bias scores for the negative-only block revealed that the entire
sample (N = 116) on average demonstrated a slight bias toward threatening faces in general (M =
.945), though this bias was not significantly different from 0, t(115) = .546, p = .586. Threat bias
scores for individuals who identified primarily as Black (M = -1.86) and primarily as White (M =
3.769) were not independently significant, t(57) = -.675, p = .502 and t(57) = 1.87, p = .067),
respectively. These bias scores were also not significantly different from each other, t(114) = 1.644, p = .103. While these results indicate that the two groups did not vary significantly in
their attentional bias trends toward threatening faces, they suggest that Black participants on
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average tended to attend away from threat to a small degree, and White participants on average
tended to orient toward threat.
Analyses of trial-level bias scores reflecting mean bias toward threat yielded similar
results, suggesting that Black participants (M = 68.51) and White participants (M = 63.77) did
not significantly differ in their attentional allocations to threatening faces overall t(114) = .845, p
= .40. The two groups did appear to differ significantly in their trial-level bias score reflecting
mean bias away from threat, t(114) = -2.209, p = .029. Black participants (M = -73.42) appeared
to demonstrate moderately larger biases away from threatening faces than did White participants
(M = -60.50). Trial-level variability scores, which presumably reflect the fluctuations in
attentional bias throughout the task, were also examined. Black participants (M = 91.53) and
White participants (M = 79.50) did not significantly differ in their patterns of attention to
threatening faces overall t(114) = 1.708, p = .090.
3.2

Testing Regression Assumptions
I took several preliminary steps to ensure that the dataset did not violate key assumptions

of linear regression. Each of the dependent variables used in the analyses, including attentional
bias scores for Black threatening faces and White threatening faces, displayed acceptable ranges
of skewness and kurtosis. P-P and Q-Q plots further suggested that the data met the assumption
of normality, as visual inspection indicated that severe deviations from the diagonal line were
not present. Durbin-Watson statistics for both bias for Black threat (1.85) and bias for White
threat (2.23) were within the recommended bounds, and scatterplots of error values displayed
random patterns with no notable funneling, which suggested that the assumption of
independence of errors had been met. Variances appeared to be equal for participants who
identified primarily as Black and those who identified primarily as White across both threat bias
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in Black faces [F(1, 114) = 2.29, p = .13] and threat bias in White faces [F(1, 114) = .307, p =
.58]. Additionally, multicollinearity among predictors fell within acceptable bounds (VIFs < 5).
3.3

Data Preparation
Trials with incorrect responses (i.e., participant misidentified location of the probe) were

excluded from analyses. Outliers were identified as reaction times below 200 ms and above
three standard deviations from each participant’s average response time and were also excluded
from analyses. These bounds have been previously used to provide a clear and accurate
reflection of response patterns (Price et al., 2015).
3.4

Preliminary Analyses
Zero-order correlations (see Tables 4, 5, and 6) were calculated among intergroup

anxiety, generalized anxiety (STICSA State and Trait), and attentional bias scores for Black
threat, White threat, and overall threat. When calculated for the overall sample, intergroup
anxiety was significantly and positively associated with both state (r = .398, p < .001) and trait
anxiety (r = .411; p < .001). There was no significant association between intergroup anxiety
and any attentional bias for overall or race-specific threat. Attentional bias for Black threat and
White threat were significantly and positively associated with overall threat bias (r’s = .709 and
.731, respectively; p < .001), but not significantly correlated with each other. Measures of state
and trait anxiety were also highly correlated, consistent with findings in previous literature (Ree
et al., 2008). No other correlations were statistically significant.
When I examined correlations separately by participant race rather than analyzing the
full sample together, key group differences were evident. In the group of individuals who
identified primarily as White, intergroup anxiety was positively and significantly correlated with
both overall threat bias (r = .272; p < .05) and bias for Black threatening faces (r = .307; p <
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.05), suggesting as intergroup anxiety increased, attentional prioritization for threat, and Black
threat in particular, also increased. In the group of individuals who identified primarily as
Black, no significant associations between intergroup anxiety and threat biases were found (all
p’s > .05). Across both groups, significant correlations among the three anxiety scales, and
between general threat bias and black and white threat biases, respectively, remained consistent
with results from the overall sample.
T-tests indicated that individuals who identified primarily as Black and those who
identified primarily as White differed significantly on measures of anxiety. Black individuals
endorsed significantly higher levels of intergroup anxiety (M = 88.88, SD = 30.93) than did
White individuals (M = 72.19, SD = 27.73), t(114) = 3.06, p = .003. In contrast, White
individuals endorsed significantly higher levels of generalized state anxiety (M = 36.52, SD =
12.76) than did Black individuals (M = 31.71, SD = 10.35), t(114) = -2.23, p = .028. White
individuals also reported higher generalized trait anxiety levels (M = 42.33, SD = 12.50) than
Black individuals (M = 35.93, SD = 11.21), t(114) = -2.90, p = .004. Although these values
reflect group differences in generalized anxiety, the mean STICSA scores for both groups fall
within the nonclinical range (Grös, et al., 2007). Black and White participants did not differ
significantly across attentional bias scores for general threat, Black threatening faces, or White
threatening faces (all p’s > .05).
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Table 4. Zero-Order correlations between variables- Full Sample (N = 116)
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6

1. Intergroup Anxiety

---

.398**

.411**

.116

-.073

.031

2. STICSA-State

---

---

.757**

.124

.023

.110

3. STICSA-Trait

---

---

---

.130

.008

.102

4. Bias for Black Threat

---

---

---

---

.041

.709**

5. Bias for White Threat

---

---

---

---

---

.731**

6. Bias for Threat Overall

---

---

---

---

---

---

Notes. STICSA = State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety. * p < .05., **p < .01

Table 5. Zero-Order correlations between variables- Black participants
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6

1. Intergroup Anxiety

---

.394**

.451**

-.014

-.252

-.145

2. STICSA-State

---

---

.743**

.074

-.003

.006

3. STICSA-Trait

---

---

---

.055

-.045

.023

4. Bias for Black Threat

---

---

---

---

.098

.809**

5. Bias for White Threat

---

---

---

---

---

.661**

6. Bias for Threat Overall

---

---

---

---

---

---

Notes. STICSA = State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety. * p < .05., **p < .01
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Table 6. Zero-Order correlations between variables- White participants
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6

1. Intergroup Anxiety

---

.613**

.584**

.307*

.085

.272*

2. STICSA-State

---

---

.742**

.209

.097

.221

3. STICSA-Trait

---

---

---

.245

.103

.247

4. Bias for Black Threat

---

---

---

---

-.079

.588**

5. Bias for White Threat

---

---

---

---

---

.758**

6. Bias for Threat Overall

---

---

---

---

---

---

Notes. STICSA = State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety. * p < .05., **p < .01
3.5

Regression Analyses
I conducted linear multiple regression analyses to examine intergroup anxiety scores,

participant race, and their interaction as predictors of attentional bias for threat. I tested two
hierarchical models, one with attentional bias score for Black threatening faces as the dependent
variable, and the second with bias scored for White threatening faces as the outcome. Results
from the first regression assessing whether participant race moderated the relationship between
intergroup anxiety and attentional bias to Black threatening faces indicated that the overall model
was not significant, ∆R2 = .022, F(3, 112) = 1.397, p >.05. Main effects of intergroup anxiety (β
= -.015, p > .05) and race (β = .043, p > .05) were not detected. The interaction between
intergroup anxiety and race similarly failed to account for a significant portion of the variance in
bias for Black threat (β = .204, p > .05) beyond that accounted for by intergroup anxiety and
race.
The second regression model examining the moderating effect of participant race on the
relationship between intergroup anxiety and attentional bias for White threatening faces was also
not significant, ∆R2 = .025, F(3, 112) = 1.281, p > .05. Main effects of intergroup anxiety (β = -
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.228, p > .05) and race (β = -.066, p > .05) were not detected. Inclusion of the interaction term
also did not account for a significant portion of the variance in bias for White threat (β = .216, p
>.05). The results suggest that participant race did not moderate the association between
intergroup anxiety and attentional bias for threat in both Black and White faces.
Table 7. Model 1: Predicting attentional bias for Black threat from intergroup anxiety
and race

Predictors
Main Effects
Intergroup Anxiety
Race

Step 1 (R2=.014) Step 2 (∆R2=.022)
___________
___________
β
t
β
t
.12
.03

1.27
.40

Interaction
Intergroup Anxiety x Race

-.02
.04

-.12
.45

.20

1.60

_____________________________________________________________________________
Note. N = 116. F-test of change from Step 1 to Step 2: F = 2.55; df = 1, 112, p = .11
Table 8. Model 2: Predicting attentional bias for White threat from intergroup anxiety
and race

Predictors
Main Effects
Intergroup Anxiety
Race

Step 1 (R2=.009)
___________
β
t
-.08
-.07

-.84
-.73

Step 2 (∆R 2=.025)
___________
β
t
-.23
.07

-1.76
-.69

Interaction
Intergroup Anxiety x Race
.22 1.69
_____________________________________________________________________________
Note. N = 116. F-test of change from Step 1 to Step 2: F = 2.85; df = 1, 112, p = .094
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4
4.1

DISCUSSION

Overview of study hypotheses and results
The current study examined associations between intergroup anxiety and attentional bias

for threat in Black and White faces. I hypothesized first that all participants, regardless of their
intergroup anxiety, would show biased attention toward angry faces. In addition, I hypothesized
that participant race would moderate the relationship between intergroup anxiety and attention
bias for angry faces, such that anxiety would be more strongly associated with biased attention
toward anger displayed by members of participants’ outgroups than anger displayed by members
of participants’ ingroups.
Results partially supported the first hypothesis—across the full sample, participants
displayed modest, but statistically non-significant, attentional biases toward general threat
(angry faces, regardless of race). The full sample showed slightly larger—and statistically
significant—attentional biases toward Black angry faces. Additional group-level analyses
suggested that White participants’ bias scores were largely responsible for this pattern of
enhanced prioritization for Black threat. White participants demonstrated significant attentional
biases toward Black threatening faces, while Black participants did not show significant biases
for Black threatening faces. Neither group showed significant biases to direct attention toward
or away from White threatening faces. These results are in line with at least one previous study
in a healthy White sample, in which participants showed significantly faster attentional
orientation toward angry Black faces than toward angry White faces (Otten, 2016). They
diverge, however, from the results of research that has compared attention to racially diverse,
but emotionally neutral, faces between Black and White individuals that demonstrated
prioritization for outgroup faces across both groups (Dickter & Bartholow, 2008).
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With regard to the second hypothesis, multiple regression analyses did not yield results
that support the proposed models: participant race did not moderate the association between
intergroup anxiety and attentional bias for threat in either Black or White faces. However,
exploratory analyses did reveal findings that are consistent with earlier research in exclusively
White samples. Specifically, for White participants, intergroup anxiety was positively
associated with biased attention toward outgroup, but not ingroup, anger. These findings, which
I discuss in more detail below, offer insight into group-level differences in attentional biases for
threat, and provides new avenues for exploration of intergroup anxiety.
4.2

Intergroup anxiety, participant race, and attention for outgroup threat
My study extended the extant dot probe literature to include both White and Black

participants and a more comprehensive measure of intergroup anxiety. Among individuals who
identified primarily as white, higher levels of intergroup anxiety were associated with stronger
attentional biases toward outgroup threat; those who identified primarily as Black did not
demonstrate a similar outgroup bias for White threatening faces. The evidence that White
participants’ intergroup anxiety was positively related to attentional prioritization for outgroup
threat aligns with findings from Richeson and Trawalter’s (2008) study that examined facets of
intergroup anxiety, race and attention for in/outgroup faces using the dot probe task. In this
study, White participants higher in external motivation (EM) to avoid prejudice, a facet of
intergroup anxiety, but not those lower in EM, displayed attentional biases for Black faces.
Importantly, this bias emerged on trials with fast presentation times (30 ms), but not those with
longer presentation times (450 ms). Notably, no bias was detected when participants viewed
happy faces, suggesting a valence-specific bias for threat in particular.
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The results appear to reflect prior findings that intergroup anxiety is associated with
magnified threat perception of outgroup faces among White participants. It remains unclear
why similar patterns were not evident among Black participants, who endorsed significantly
higher levels of intergroup anxiety than White participants. While outgroup compared to
ingroup members have long been hypothesized to represent potential danger (Cosmides et al.,
2003), it may be that the source of the threat varies by perceiver. Stephan et al.’s (2002) test of
their integrated threat model, for instance, suggested that, although intergroup anxiety predicts
negative outgroup attitudes in both White and Black participants, the reasons underlying those
attitudes may vary. For white participants, “realistic threat” regarding Black individuals (i.e.,
concerns that those who are Black constitute a threat to their political/economic power,
physical/material well-being) was a stronger predictor of negative attitudes. For Black
participants, in contrast, “symbolic threat” (i.e., concern that those who are White pose threats to
their ingroup culture, values, or world view) was a stronger predictor.
Angry outgroup faces within the dot probe task may serve as “realistic threat” signals
that convey imminent personal danger and that are particularly salient for White individuals.
Such faces thus may draw White participants’ attention at especially rapid speeds. This
possibility appears to align with Pergamin-Hight and colleagues’ (2015) findings suggesting that
the content specificity of the threatening stimulus to the fears of the viewer (in this case, Black
angry faces may be more evocative of White individuals’ intergroup anxiety-related concerns)
drives attentional biases. Caution may thus be warranted in generalizing findings from research
on attentional biases for threat in predominantly White samples, given that most studies to date
using dot probe tasks have not included Black participants.
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Moreover, the present findings suggest that research may need to consider race in more
nuanced ways than is typical. For example, it may be important to take into account the status
of a given racial group in the context that participants inhabit. In work relevant to this issue,
Riek et al., (2006) suggested that group status (high/low) may moderate associations between
intergroup anxiety and cognitive outcomes such as negative attitudes. They posited, for
example, that lower status group members (Black Americans, in their study) may have more
experience interacting with higher status group members (White Americans) than vice versa.
Thus members of groups treated as lower status may have “adapted” to their own intergroup
anxiety in a way that minimizes its influence on their attitudes. Stephan et al. (2002) further
suggested that Black individuals, as a historically marginalized and “low power” group, may
display reduced reactivity to threats posed by White individuals as they have “less to lose,
having already been dispossessed by so much” (p. 1252).
This idea that low status may attenuate reactivity to outgroup threat, however, conflicts
with assertions that lower-status individuals should display hypervigilance for cues of social
threat precisely because of their history as targets of prejudice and discrimination. Ong (2013)
suggested that faster identification of threat from higher status individuals should function as a
defense mechanism that allows members of low-status groups to better anticipate and prevent
discriminatory treatment. Perhaps the context in which threat cues are presented matters more
for those from lower-status groups than those from higher status groups. Cues presented via
static images in a low-stakes computer task, for instance, may not elicit the same responses from
low-status group members as cues that appear during real-life, emotionally-charged interactions
where the probability of mistreatment can be high. Future work might explore this possibility
by amplifying the ecological validity, potentially staging real-world interaction with
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confederates who vary as a function of status. Research might also recruit participants from
regions where people with different racial identities hold varying levels of status.
4.3

TL-BS
Given that recent research has raised concerns about the use of traditionally-calculated

aggregated mean bias scores in dot probe studies (Price et al., 2015), I included a negative-only
dot probe block, which comprised solely angry-neutral and neutral-neutral trials (i.e., happyneutral trials removed) and allowed me to calculate bias scores in two ways (aggregated mean
bias score and trial-level bias score) and extract a bias variability score. I calculated the
traditional aggregated mean threat bias score for this negative-only block just as I did for the
main dot-probe block (i.e., the block with angry-neutral, happy-neutral, and neutral-neutral
trials), and I obtained similar findings. Just as they did during the main task block, all
participants, on average, demonstrated small, non-significant biases toward threatening faces.
Also consistent with findings for the main task, Black participants and White participants did not
significantly differ in this aggregated mean bias toward threat. Similarly, Black and White
participants did not significantly differ in their TL-BS score reflecting mean bias toward threat.
Black and White participants did, however, differ significantly in their trial-level bias scores
reflecting mean bias away from threat in general, with Black participants displaying stronger
biases away from threat than White participants. The bias scores themselves were not
statistically different from zero.
Additionally, the two participant groups did not differ significantly in their attentional
bias variability scores. Previous studies that have used dot probe variability scores have detected
significant differences between healthy and clinical samples (Iacoviello et al., 2014; Naim et al.,
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2015; Zvielli et al., 2015). Results from the present study suggest that within a non-clinical
sample, such differences may not be evident.
Although Black and White participants did differ significantly on measures of intergroup
anxiety and state and trait anxiety, mean scores for members of both groups were below cutoffs
on trait anxiety measures that indicate likely presence of clinical psychopathology (Grös et al.,
2007). Moreover, the two groups displayed similar patterns of fluctuation in attention to threat
throughout the dot probe task. It will be important for future research to more closely examine
attention bias variability in non-clinical samples to determine the utility of such measures for
understanding the full spectrum of anxious symptoms. However, even null findings like those
obtained in the present study are informative, as they suggest that the two groups did not vary on
an increasingly prioritized facet of visual attention (Molloy, 2018), which could have introduced
additional confounds to the central models tested.
4.4

New insights about intergroup anxiety
Although the construct of intergroup anxiety per se was not the primary focus of this

study, we nonetheless obtained findings that may help us better understand it. Specifically, we
examined associations between intergroup anxiety and both state and trait anxiety in both Black
and White young adults. For both the full sample and Black and White groups separately,
intergroup anxiety was significantly and positively correlated with state and trait anxiety. These
findings suggest that, regardless of whether intergroup-anxious individuals identify with a
majority or minority racial group, they also experience considerable anxiety in contexts that do
not necessarily involve interaction with members of other groups. This is important, because
research on the potential overlap between intergroup anxiety and other forms of anxiety or
psychopathology is sparse. Indeed, there appears to be just one published study that has
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examined the boundaries of these constructs. Britt et al. (1996) found that White, high
intergroup anxious individuals endorsed greater state anxiety before interacting with Black
individuals than before interacting with White individuals. While explorations of the
relationship between intergroup anxiety and other forms of anxiety are limited, the present study
suggests intergroup anxiety and generalized anxiety are highly correlated. Future analyses may
consider the possibility that different kinds of anxiety may impact attentional allocation in
distinctive ways or in different contexts.
Moreover, Black participants endorsed significantly higher levels of intergroup anxiety,
or anxiety related to social interactions with White people than White participants endorsed
regarding interactions with Black people, consistent with findings from a prior study that
examined intergroup anxiety in a diverse sample (Stephan et al., 2002). It may be that as
members of a historically marginalized group within the United States, Black study participants
may experience heightened anxiety related to anticipated and experienced negative interactions
with White individuals. Indeed, in the U.S., nearly half of Black individuals have reported being
targets of racial violence, personal and institutional discrimination, and slurs and insensitive
comments (NPR/Harvard, 2017).
White participants, however, reported significantly higher average levels of generalized
state and trait anxiety than did Black participants. Epidemiological studies examining mental
health in diverse populations are limited, though some have documented higher rates of anxiety
disorders in African American and Caribbean Black populations compared to White individuals
(Watkins, Assari, & Johnson-Lawrence, 2015). However, it is important to note that the extent
to which group differences in symptom reporting patterns and mental health education regarding
anxiety and other psychiatric diagnoses (Snowden, 2012) may have affected our self-report data
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is unclear. It is possible that, although individuals who identify primarily as Black may exhibit a
distinctive profile of generalized anxiety (Carter, Sbrocco, & Carter, 1996) or may be reluctant
to endorse symptoms of generalized anxiety due to stigma (Hunter & Schmidt, 2010; Ward,
Clark, & Heidrich, 2009), they are more willing to endorse anxiety associated with negative
intergroup interactions, given that such anxiety may be culturally sanctioned (Hunter &
Schmidt, 2010).
4.5

Limitations and Strengths
4.5.1

Presentation Time

In addition to intergroup anxiety and participant race, the two main predictors in the
regression model, other variables may have contributed to participants’ perception of and
orientation to threat on in- or outgroup faces. One such variable is the stimulus presentation
time. Participants in this study viewed emotional face pairs for a very short presentation time
(100 ms). Several studies have suggested that shorter (thus faster) presentation times allow for
more precise capture of early visual attention. Van Rooijen et al. (2017) noted that within the
traditional, longer 500 ms timeframe used in the dot probe task, viewers have the ability to make
multiple saccades, or eye movements, and trial responses are therefore unlikely to reflect initial
orientation. Investigations using fMRI also commonly find differences in neural activity when
viewing ingroup and outgroup faces during short stimulus presentation times (e.g., 30 ms) that
are no longer evident when exposure windows are lengthened (e.g., 450 ms). Thus, initial socialemotional processing in the brain appears to occur rapidly and may later be suppressed or
regulated by activity in neural regions (e.g., DPFC, ACC) related to executive control
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Richeson & Trawalter, 2008).
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It nonetheless remains unclear how viewers, during a very brief window of exposure,
allocate their attentional resources when faces convey multiple social and emotional cues. While
a shorter presentation time allowed for a more targeted examination of early attentional
allocation, it is possible that limiting viewing time led to prioritization of one cue over another,
or reduced the full and equal processing of both emotional expression and race. For instance, in
a ERP study that required participants to view neutral images of Black and White male and
female faces, Ito and Urland (2003) found that White participants oriented to racial cues as early
as 100 ms after stimulus onset, while attention to gender cues peaked nearly 50 ms later. Dickter
and Bartholow (2007) also found evidence of early attentional prioritization for race, as their
ERP data suggested that participants attended to racial cues even when those cues were taskirrelevant (i.e., instructed to focus on gender). Thus, although emotional expression and race
have been shown to magnify the perception of threat on a face in later stages of processing (e.g.,
Ackerman et al., 2006), attention for certain facial qualities may occur during early—but
different—time periods in early visual attention.
In a later ERP study, Ito, Thompson, and Cacioppo (2004) examined the time course of
attention for both race and emotionality in displayed faces. They noted that while both race and
emotion are processed early (170 ms or faster), the two factors appear to be processed
“independently and in parallel”, with only marginal evidence of interactions in early stages of
processing (p. 13). In other words, while several studies have documented faster attentional
orienting for Black faces over White faces (Al-Janabi, MacLeod, & Rhodes, 2012; Trawalter et
al., 2008) and for threatening faces over happy or neutral ones (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), it remains
unclear if race and emotion together magnify attentional biases for Black, threatening faces in
particular in very early attention.
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Variations in participant anxiety may also impact the speed at which emotional cues are
detected. Sass et al. (2010) noted that ERP responses to emotional stimuli appear earlier in
anxious samples than in healthy samples. Further, the time course of this response in early visual
processing can vary as a function of anxiety subtype; participants who endorse more symptoms
of anxious arousal appear to demonstrate earlier (~100 ms) effects than participants who endorse
increased anxious apprehension (Sass et al., 2010). This suggests that even subtle differences in
viewer profiles may influence the sensitivity to emotion-related cues.
4.5.2

Additional facial features that signify threat

This study was one of very few focused on attentional bias for emotional faces that
included both a diverse facial stimulus set and a diverse participant sample. In particular, prior
studies have typically recruited only White participants. A growing body of research suggests
that attention to diversity in both stimulus cues and participants is important (Cundiff, 2012).
Findings from several studies suggest that varied facial features can guide attention and
potentially increase the salience or threat value of a face; for example, people tend to view both
juvenile features (Zebrowitz, 2017) and faces that resemble more familiar individuals as more
trustworthy and less threatening (Zebrowitz et al., 2007).
Further, features associated with racial group membership also appear to influence rapid
orienting to and evaluation of stimuli. Recent investigations have found that both White and
Black participants tended to perceive individuals with features more stereotypically identified as
“Black”, such as darker skin, broader noses, and fuller lips, as threatening (Kleider- Offutt,
Bond, Williams, & Bohil, 2018). Black individuals with more stereotypical features were also
more likely to be “shot” in the context of a shoot/don’t shoot task (Kahn and Davies, 2010).
Indeed, researchers have found both White and Black participants to be especially likely to
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associate Black faces with negative qualities such as danger and criminality when the faces
displayed these stereotypical features (Kleider-Offutt, Bond, & Hegerty, 2017; Kleider, Cavrak,
& Knuycky, 2012). These findings suggest that stereotypes about physiognomy may play an
influential role in the perception of threat value separate from, but also potentially in interaction
with, emotional expression.
Although we carefully validated the stimulus faces used in our dot probe task to ensure
that they expressed equivalent degrees of particular emotions, we did not characterize them
according to these additional facial qualities. Additionally, in efforts to closely match this dot
probe task to those used commonly in the literature (e.g., Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Mogg,
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004), we presented stimulus faces in grayscale. It is possible that the use
of grayscale rather than color images, a practice designed to control for variables that influence
visual salience such as luminosity, reduced the task’s ecological validity and may have obscure
potentially important effects of skin tone variation on rapid threat appraisal.
Taken together, the studies exploring race-related physiognomy suggest that associations
between stereotypically Black racial features and threat, even in the absence of explicit
emotionality (e.g., angry expression) may influence perception of Black faces as particularly
dangerous or threatening. These findings lay a foundation for next steps toward enhancing facial
dot probe task result’s generalizability to members of diverse populations. Researchers,
especially those studying diverse samples, may benefit from mindfully selecting stimuli with
efforts to balance the presentation of relevant facial features to allow for examination of their
impact on threat evaluation.
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4.5.3

Intergroup anxiety—a more nuanced construct?

While individuals with high levels of intergroup anxiety tend to demonstrate concern
about the outcome of intergroup interactions, the precise source or content of anxiety can vary.
Greenland et. al (2012) proposed that intergroup anxiety contains two distinct constructs: selfanxiety—anxiety that one will think or behave in a way that is prejudiced—and other-anxiety—
anxiety that outgroup members may pose a threat of harm. Consistent with this idea, empirical
evidence suggests that group-level differences such as majority/minority status are associated
with distinct intergroup concerns; whereas majority group members may worry primarily about
appearing prejudiced, minority group members may endorse worries primarily about being
discriminated against (Doerr et al., 2011; Shelton & Richeson, 2006). Findings from the present
study raise the possibility that, at least within the context of the dot-probe task, increased
vigilance for threat on an outgroup face is more strongly related to fears of appearing prejudiced
than fears of experiencing discrimination. Thus, the global intergroup anxiety measure used in
this study may have been insufficiently precise for use with diverse individuals for whom items
may have held different meanings. Additional research on the nuances of intergroup anxiety
may allow for a more detailed understanding of its influence on attentional allocation.
4.6

Future Directions
Results of the present moderation analyses suggested that race did not significantly

moderate the relationship between intergroup anxiety and attentional bias for threat on Black or
White faces. It may be that we inadequately accounted for several variables that earlier research
has linked to differences in emotion perception and that may also contribute to potential variance
in attentional bias for threat. Numerous studies have shown, for example, that implicit attitudes,
or judgements “outside conscious attentional focus” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) about Black
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individuals or stereotypically Black features, can influence threat perception. For instance,
Cunningham and colleagues (2004) found that stronger negative implicit associations regarding
outgroup or Black individuals relate to greater amygdala activation for Black than White faces
among White adults. Negative implicit associations have also been linked to more rapid
identification of anger presented on Black faces than White faces (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen,
2003), increased threat evaluation for outgroup faces (Maner et al., 2005, study 2), and greater
attentional preference for Black angry faces (Otten, 2016). Together, these outcomes suggest
more accessible negative attitudes or stereotypes about members of a group can amplify the
threat value of faces from that group, at least early in the attentional process. In the present
dataset, it is possible that including implicit associations as predictors of attentional bias for
threat as covariates in the regression model would facilitate accurate detection of associations
between intergroup anxiety and attention bias for threat. Future research in attentional allocation
for emotional faces, and particularly those that incorporate diverse stimuli and participants, may
consider inclusion of an implicit associations measure to permit precise characterization of
factors that contribute to biases in attention.
A second pathway for future work might include examination of other in/outgroup
variables. While treating race as the primary group variable allowed for a detailed exploration of
how racial intergroup anxiety might modulate attention for threat, other group-related variables
may warrant similar examination. Gender, for example, is also a salient marker of group
membership, and men and women may also process emotional stimuli in different ways. Indeed,
men and women have shown differences in their neural processing of emotional images (Lang et
al., 1998); threat evaluation (Maner et al., 2005) and attentional bias for emotional faces within
the dot probe task (Carlson, Aday, & Rubin, 2018). Moreover, Sass et al. (2010) found that men
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demonstrated preferential processing of threatening stimuli in an emotion-word Stroop task at
considerably earlier stages of visual processing (100 ms) than did women (300 ms).
Further, studies that have considered stimulus gender along with race have shown that
male outgroup faces tend to be evaluated as more threatening than female faces (Becker et al.,
2007). In the context of the present study, it is possible that attentional bias for threat varied
depending on the intersection of stimulus race and gender; for example, White participants’
attention to anger could have been heightened when it appeared on a Black male face than on a
Black female face. Unfortunately, our task includes insufficient numbers of stimuli to examine
bias at this level of detail, but future dot probe versions might be extended to permit examination
of multiple intersecting stimulus characteristics as modulators of threat. Further, use of
intergroup anxiety measures that target gender rather than race may facilitate exploration of the
relationship between gender-based intergroup anxiety and attentional bias for threat in race- and
gender-diverse faces.
4.7

Conclusions
The current study is the first that we are aware of to use a dot probe task to examine the

relationship between intergroup anxiety and Black and White participants’ attentional bias for
threat in Black and White faces. Key findings revealed group differences in attentional biases
for outgroup threat, such that White, but not Black, participants displayed significant biases
toward Black threatening faces, which was consistent with prior research. The findings also
yielded insight into the cognitive and affective profiles of individuals high in intergroup anxiety.
Specifically, we found positive, significant associations between intergroup anxiety and both
state and trait anxiety; further work is needed to test Stephan’s (2014) assertion that intergroup
anxiety represents a more specific facet of social anxiety.
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Additionally, among White participants only, increases in intergroup anxiety were
associated with increases in attentional bias toward Black, but not White, faces. We failed,
however, to detect a significant moderational effect of participant race on the relationship
between intergroup anxiety and attention bias for threat in Black or White faces. It is possible
that our use of rapid stimulus presentation times, our inability to take additional phenotypic
markers of race into account, and a global measurement of intergroup anxiety, precluded us from
detecting a statistical moderation effect. Overall, however, the present findings suggest that
elements of the facial context (i.e., stimulus race) in which an angry expression appears may
magnify its threat value for some individuals. These results suggest that stimulus and participant
demographic and identity characteristics are important considerations for new studies using the
facial dot probe task. Future dot probe studies might include additional variables, such as
implicit attitudes and gender, as extant research suggests they may play a role in attentional bias
for threat.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Demographic Questionnaire
What is your Age (in years)?
What is your gender identity?
1.
Woman
2.
Man
3.
Transgender
4.
Self-identify (please specify)
What was your sex at birth?
1.
Female
2.
Male
3.
Intersex
Do you consider yourself to be:
1.
Heterosexual
2.
Lesbian
3.
Gay
4.
Bisexual
5.
Questioning
6.
Self-identify (please specify)
People are different in their sexual attraction to other people. Which best describes your current
feelings? Are you:
1.
Only attracted to women
2.
Mostly attracted to women
3.
Equally attracted to women and men
4.
Mostly attracted to men
5.
Only attracted to men
6.
Not sure
What is your race/ethnicity?
1.
African American / Black
2.
American Indian or Alaskan Native
3.
Asian American / Asian
4.
Hispanic / Latino/a
5.
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
6.
Multi-racial
7.
White
8.
Self-identify (please specify)
If you would like to, please further describe your racial, cultural, ethnic, or regional identity:
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What is your country of origin?
Are you an international student?
1.
Yes
2.
No
Relationship status:
1.
Single
2.
Serious dating or committed relationship
3.
Civil union, domestic partnership, or equivalent
4.
Married
5.
Separated
6.
Divorced
7.
Widowed
Religious or spiritual preference:
1.
Agnostic
2.
Atheist
3.
Buddhist
4.
Catholic
5.
Christian
6.
Hindu
7.
Jewish
8.
Muslim
9.
No preference
10.
Self-identify (please specify)
11.
Other religious or spiritual preference:
To what extent does your religious or spiritual preference play an important role in your life?
1.
Very Important
2.
Important
3.
Neutral
4.
Unimportant
5.
Very unimportant
Current academic status:
1.
Freshman / First-year
2.
Sophomore
3.
Junior
4.
Senior
5.
Graduate / professional degree student
6.
Non-student
7.
High-school student taking college classes
8.
Non-degree student
9.
Faculty or staff
Other (please specify)
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With whom do you live? (check all that apply)
1.
Alone
2.
Spouse, partner, or significant other
3.
Roommate(s)
4.
Children
5.
Parent(s) or guardian(s)
6.
Family other
7.
Other (please specify)
Did you transfer from another campus/institution to this school?
1.
Yes
2.
No
What is the average number of hours you work per week during the school year (paid
employment only)?
Are you the first generation in your family to attend college?
1.
Yes
2.
No
How would you describe your financial situation right now?:
1.
Always stressful
2.
Often stressful
3.
Sometimes stressful
4.
Rarely stressful
5.
Never stressful
How would you describe your financial situation while growing up?:
1.
Always stressful
2.
Often stressful
3.
Sometimes stressful
4.
Rarely stressful
5.
Never stressful
Appendix B. State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety
State Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety-State Version
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. Beside each
statement are four numbers which indicate the degree with which each statement is selfdescriptive of mood at this moment (e.g., 1=not at all, 4=very much so). Please read each
statement carefully and circle the number which best indicates how you feel right now, at this
very moment, even if this is not how you usually feel.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

My heart beats fast
My muscles are tense.
I feel agonized over my problems.
I think that others won’t approve of me.
I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my
mind soon enough.
I feel dizzy.
My muscles feel weak.
I feel trembly and shaky.
I picture some future misfortune.
I can’t get some thought out of my mind.
I have trouble remembering things.
My face feels hot.
I think that the worst will happen.
My arms and legs are stiff.
My throat feels dry.
I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.
I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.
My breathing is fast and shallow.
I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.
I have butterflies in my stomach.
My palms feel clammy.

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

State Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety-Trait Version
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. Beside each
statement are four numbers which indicate how often each statement is true of you (e.g., 1=not at
all, 4= very much so). Please read each statement carefully and circle the number which best
indicates how often, in general, the statement is true of you.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

My heart beats fast
My muscles are tense.
I feel agonized over my problems.
I think that others won’t approve of me.
I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my
mind soon enough.
I feel dizzy.
My muscles feel weak.
I feel trembly and shaky.
I picture some future misfortune.
I can’t get some thought out of my mind.
I have trouble remembering things.
My face feels hot.
I think that the worst will happen.

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

My arms and legs are stiff.
My throat feels dry.
I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.
I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.
My breathing is fast and shallow.
I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.
I have butterflies in my stomach.
My palms feel clammy.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Appendix C. Intergroup Anxiety Measure
Intergroup Anxiety Scale—adapted from Stephan & Stephan (1985)
For self-identified Black/African-American participants:
Instructions: The following set of questions concerns situations you could find yourself in when
interacting with White/Caucasian individuals. Please indicate how you would react to these
situations. In each situation you would be the only Black/African-American individual present.
The other people would be White/Caucasian.
1. Going to a small party (less than 15 people)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all self-conscious ---Extremely self-conscious
2. Spending time with a member of the opposite sex
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all anxious ---------------Extremely anxious
3. Meeting strangers and introducing yourself
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all nervous ---------------Extremely nervous
4. Being caught up in a large crowd (for instance, a demonstration)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all tense ---------------------Extremely tense
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5. People staring at you and talking about you among themselves
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all uncomfortable ----Extremely uncomfortable
6. Giving a speech to members of this group (50 people or so)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all worried ---------------Extremely worried
7. Dealing with several members of this group who seem threatening
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all afraid -------------------Extremely afraid
8. Being criticized unjustly for something you did
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all upset ---------------------Extremely upset
9. Being unable to make yourself understood when it is important
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all frustrated ----------Extremely frustrated
10. Being laughed at for a minor mistake you have made
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all embarrassed ---Extremely embarrassed
11. Being taken advantage of (for instance, by a merchant)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all angry ---------------------Extremely angry
12. Being totally ignored by the people at a social gathering
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Not at all rejected ---------------Extremely rejected
13. Unintentionally offending a member of the other group by making a small social error
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all guilty --------------------Extremely guilty
14. People refusing to talk to you because they dislike your group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all offended -------------Extremely offended
15. Feeling that your group is being unfairly criticized by members of the other group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all defensive ----------Extremely defensive

For self-identified White/Caucasian participants:
Instructions: The following set of questions concerns situations you could find yourself in when
interacting with Black/African-American individuals. Please indicate how you would react to
these situations. In each situation you would be the only White/Caucasian individual present.
The other people would be Black/African-American.
1. Going to a small party (less than 15 people)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all self-conscious ---Extremely self-conscious
2. Spending time with a member of the opposite sex
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all anxious ---------------Extremely anxious
3. Meeting strangers and introducing yourself
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Not at all nervous ---------------Extremely nervous
4. Being caught up in a large crowd (for instance, a demonstration)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all tense ---------------------Extremely tense
5. People staring at you and talking about you among themselves
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all uncomfortable ----Extremely uncomfortable
6. Giving a speech to members of this group (50 people or so)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all worried ---------------Extremely worried
7. Dealing with several members of this group who seem threatening
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all afraid -------------------Extremely afraid
8. Being criticized unjustly for something you did
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all upset ---------------------Extremely upset
9. Being unable to make yourself understood when it is important
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all frustrated ----------Extremely frustrated
10. Being laughed at for a minor mistake you have made
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all embarrassed ---Extremely embarrassed
11. Being taken advantage of (for instance, by a merchant)
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all angry ---------------------Extremely angry
12. Being totally ignored by the people at a social gathering
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all rejected ---------------Extremely rejected
13. Unintentionally offending a member of the other group by making a small social error
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all guilty --------------------Extremely guilty
14. People refusing to talk to you because they dislike your group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all offended -------------Extremely offended
15. Feeling that your group is being unfairly criticized by members of the other group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Not at all defensive ----------Extremely defensive

